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Making Trial Within a Reasonable
Time a Right Once More
Steve Coughlan*
Jordan1 got it right.
The use of presumptive ceilings to determine whether there has been
a violation of a Charter right is a blunt instrument which eliminates most
of the ability of judges to consider the individual circumstances of cases
and to exercise discretion. It allows no role for what might seem to be an
important consideration, the seriousness of the offence. Had this been
the Court’s first attempt at structuring the right, it would seem
unsophisticated and simplistic.
But of course Jordan is not the first attempt at outlining the contours
of the right to a trial within a reasonable time: it is more like the third or
fourth. And as a response to the reality which confronted the Court — a
reality of the Court’s own making — Jordan made the right choice in
eliminating as much discretion as possible.

I. THE PROBLEM ARISES
Trial within a reasonable time case law is a fascinating study in how
the underlying attitudes of judges can matter more than the legal rules
themselves. I will argue here that the history of that right can be
understood through the influence of two factors: the difference between
individual and institutional delay; and the role and meaning of prejudice.
The first is a distinction which the Court has still not sufficiently drawn,
though Jordan has the effect of allowing for that distinction. The second
is an issue about which members of the Court disagreed in principle
through a series of cases 25 to 30 years ago, and where eventually the
majority made what proved to be the wrong choice: Jordan reverses that
error. When the history of the case law is analyzed through those two
*
1

Schulich School of Law.
R. v. Jordan, [2016] S.C.J. No. 27, 2016 SCC 27 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Jordan”].
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factors, we can see how we ended up where we were pre-Jordan, and
therefore why the response in that case was the necessary and
appropriate one.
1. Individual vs. Institutional Delay
The earliest trial within a reasonable time cases dealt with claims of
what I term “individual delay”. For example, in Rahey there was a
motion for a directed verdict: the trial judge adjourned that decision
19 times over a period of 11 months.2 In Smith a preliminary inquiry was
put off three separate times, with the result that it was not scheduled to
begin until 15 months after the charges were laid.3 In both of those cases,
there was a successful section 11(b) claim. The Court created a test
outlining a number of factors to consider (the length of the delay, the
reasons, waiver, and prejudice), but fundamentally it was not difficult to
conclude that these cases took “too long”. The Court was aware of how
long it would normally take to decide a motion or schedule a preliminary
inquiry in those jurisdictions, and these decisions took markedly longer
than the norm.
Matters become more difficult when institutional delay is at stake. In
those cases the problem is that the entire system is too slow. To make a
section 11(b) claim based on institutional delay is to argue that the norm
itself is too long, which is a harder claim to assess. In individual delay
cases we have a norm against which to measure: in institutional delay
cases we do not have that.
That was the issue which the Court first addressed in Askov, where
the claim was based on the argument that cases in Brampton generally
took longer to get to trial in Superior Court than they should.4 It was also
the issue in Morin, where the claim was that cases in Oshawa generally
took longer to get to Provincial Court than they should.5 Morin became
the governing authority on trial within a reasonable time cases for the
following quarter century.
We shall say more about these two cases later, but at the moment it is
sufficient to note that, although institutional delay is quite a different
problem from individual delay, the Court adopted essentially the same
2
3
4
5

R. v. Rahey, [1987] S.C.J. No. 23, [1987] 1 S.C.R. 588 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Rahey”].
R. v. Smith, [1989] S.C.J. No. 119, [1989] 2 S.C.R. 1120 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Smith”].
R. v. Askov, [1990] S.C.J. No. 106, [1990] 2 S.C.R. 1199 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Askov”].
R. v. Morin, [1992] S.C.J. No. 25, [1992] 1 S.C.R. 771 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Morin”].

(2017) 81 S.C.L.R. (2d)

MAKING TRIAL

215

approach. The framework which was developed in Rahey and a few
subsequent individual delay cases was applied in Askov and Morin, with
little obvious change. That was unwise, because the problems are not
at all the same: being able to schedule most preliminary inquiries in
six months but having one fall through the cracks for 15 months is
quite different from not being able to schedule any preliminary inquiries
before 15 months. Different problems require different solutions, but the
same analysis, now interpreted through the lens of institutional delay,
was applied to all cases.
So that is the first factor that needs to be considered: the shift from
analyzing cases of individual delay to analyzing cases of institutional
delay, without noticing that it is a very different question. Let us look
now at the second issue, the changing role of prejudice in the section 11(b)
analysis.
2. The Role of Prejudice
It oversimplifies matters to speak generically of “prejudice”: in fact
three separate types of prejudice have been identified as potentially
relevant in section 11(b) cases:
Prejudice in this context is concerned with the three interests of the
accused that s. 11(b) protects: liberty, as regards to pre-trial custody or
bail conditions; security of the person, in the sense of being free from
the stress and cloud of suspicion that accompanies a criminal charge;
and the right to make full answer and defence, insofar as delay can
prejudice the ability of the defendant to lead evidence, cross-examine
witnesses, or otherwise to raise a defence.6

Those same three types of prejudice — security, liberty, and fair trial —
have been acknowledged routinely since Mills, the Court’s first section 11(b)
decision.7 However, for the first few years — that is, until Askov — there
was disagreement about the significance of each type of prejudice. Justice
Lamer, as he then was, espoused the view that prejudice to the security
interest by itself was sufficient to make out a violation of section 11(b):
6

R. v. Godin, [2009] S.C.J. No. 26, 2009 SCC 26, at para. 30 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter

“Godin”].
7
R. v. Mills, [1986] S.C.J. No. 39, [1986] 1 S.C.R. 863 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Mills”]: see,
for example, para. 150, referring to “the three interests which the speedy trial right was designed to
protect: (i) to prevent oppressive pretrial incarceration; (ii) to minimize anxiety and concern of the
accused; and (iii) to limit the possibility that the defence will be impaired.”
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this was what he had in mind when he argued in Rahey that “prejudice
underlies the right … actual prejudice need not be, indeed is not, relevant to
establishing a violation of s. 11(b).”8
In Lamer J.’s view, other rights, such as section 7, were more suited to
dealing with prejudice to liberty and fair trial interests.
Justice Wilson disagreed with this position. In her view
...[w]e cannot treat [rights] as a number of watertight compartments. They
represent a series of rights which any person charged with an offence has,
but there is nothing to say that they are mutually exclusive.9

The two judges continued exactly this disagreement from Rahey and
Mills in a series of cases: Kalanj,10 Conway,11 Smith,12 and Askov.13 At
first blush, Wilson J.’s position might seem the more reasonable — what
is the harm in protecting an interest of the accused under more than one
right? And, indeed in Askov a majority of the Court finally opted for her
approach. It is important, however, to understand the danger Lamer J.
was trying to guard against, since it is exactly the danger which
materialized immediately after Askov.
His point was that prejudice to the security interest — which was
inherent in every section 11(b) claim — is sufficient prejudice by itself:
…prejudice is part of the rationale for the right and is assured by the
very presence of s. 11(b) in the Charter. Consequently, there exists an
irrebuttable presumption that, as of the moment of the charge, the
accused suffers a prejudice the guarantee is aimed at limiting, and that
the prejudice increases over time.14

That was why he argued that prejudice to the fair trial and liberty
interests were irrelevant and that an accused ought not to be allowed to
lead evidence relating to them. His logic was simple: if evidence of those
sorts of prejudice was allowed to make some cases seem stronger, then
cases without that sort of evidence would begin to seem weaker. But
such claims were not weaker, because security interest prejudice by itself
was sufficient. Therefore, to allow evidence of those other sorts of
prejudice risked undermining the purpose of the right.
8
9
10
11
12
13
14

Rahey, supra, note 2, at para. 35.
Mills, supra, note 7, at para. 285.
R. v. Kalanj, [1989] S.C.J. No. 71, [1989] 1 S.C.R. 1594 (S.C.C.).
R. v. Conway, [1989] S.C.J. No. 70, [1989] 1 S.C.R. 1659 (S.C.C.).
Supra, note 3.
Supra, note 4.
Rahey, supra, note 2, at para. 36.

(2017) 81 S.C.L.R. (2d)

MAKING TRIAL

217

Justice Lamer proved to be correct, and this is a problem which
bedevilled section 11(b) case law for the next 25 years. Indeed, that
became apparent in the very next case, Morin, where the Court dismissed
the appellant’s claim in large part based on the absence of any prejudice:
what they meant by that was that she had not led evidence of prejudice to
her fair trial or liberty interests. As Lamer J. pointed out in dissent, the
Crown “has not even attempted to show that her security interests have
not been affected”.15 More broadly, in the cases following Morin, for
practical purposes an accused who could not show some infringement of
her liberty or fair trial interests would almost certainly fail in a section 11(b)
claim: security interest prejudice alone was not enough.
That is the first way in which the role of prejudice changed: by
shifting from simply being about security of the person to including
other concerns. However, Morin also implemented a more insidious
change regarding prejudice.
Askov had sent a shock wave through the justice system by setting out
guidelines for how long cases should take. Only a minuscule part of this
was caused by judges granting section 11(b) applications: for the most
part it was because Crown prosecutors seemed to go through their files
with a weed-whacker, throwing out anything which did not comply: as
the Court noted in Morin, post-Askov over 47,000 charges were stayed or
withdrawn in Ontario alone.16 Although this was not the fault of courts, it
was the Supreme Court that got the blame, and that clearly affected the
decision in the next case, Morin.
In some ways the decisions in Askov and Morin are extremely similar:
both set out essentially the same framework, and both suggest time periods
as guidelines to reach certain stages. The subtext to the two decisions,
however, is exactly opposite: Askov had implied “be worried about delay”
but Morin implied “don’t be worried about delay”. This is most apparent
in its treatment of the issue of prejudice, and what it takes to be the typical
accused’s attitude towards it. They held, for example, that:
An accused is often not interested in exercising the right bestowed on him
by s. 11(b). His interest lies in having the right infringed by the
prosecution so that he can escape a trial on the merits. … This right must
be interpreted in a manner which recognizes the abuse which may be
invoked by some accused.17
15
16
17

Morin, supra, note 5, at para. 5.
Id., at para. 7.
Id., at para. 62, in part quoting a paper written by Doherty J.
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Perhaps even more tellingly they held: “the prosecution may establish by
evidence that the accused is in the majority group who do not want an early
trial and that the delay benefited rather than prejudiced the accused.”18
The attitude underlying these comments goes well beyond saying that
prejudice to an accused’s security interest is not sufficient; it is saying
that security prejudice is not prejudice at all, but a benefit to the accused.
Two things are immediately noteworthy about his approach. First, it
had the effect of making section 11(b) functionally limited to individual,
as opposed to institutional, delay. Most accused aren’t worried about
delay, it says, only some accused. But in that case the interests protected
by section 11(b) can be satisfied by finding the few squeaky wheels who
are complaining and moving them to the front of the queue, and then
letting the rest of the system chug along as slowly as it likes. There is no
incentive to deal with institutional delay.
Second, this is a remarkably ironic result from the decision. The
reason the Court downgraded the accused’s interests in Morin was
because it wanted to protect a societal interest in speedy trials. But
society cannot make a section 11(b) application — only an individual
accused can do that, and the Court had just said to treat such claims with
suspicion: Morin says that the right response to an accused who says she
wants a speedy trial is “yeah, suuuuure you do”. With no one able to
advance society’s interest and claims by an accused generally ignored
unless they dealt with a one-off problem, the net result was that the very
societal interest in a speedy overall system that the Court wanted to
protect had been sacrificed.
Looked at in this light, it can hardly be surprising that the Court found
in Jordan, years later, that “a culture of complacency towards delay has
emerged in the criminal justice system”.19 Morin all but flat-out said “be
complacent about delay”.

II. THE RESPONSES TO THE PROBLEM
1. The Gentle Nudge: R. v. Godin
Looking solely at numbers of cases is an uncertain instrument, but is
perhaps instructive in this context. In the five years immediately prior to
18
19

Id., at para. 64 (emphasis added).
Jordan, supra, note 1, at para. 40.

(2017) 81 S.C.L.R. (2d)

MAKING TRIAL

219

Morin (1987 to 1992) there were 320 decisions about trial within a
reasonable time: in the five years after (1992 to 1997) there were only
173 such cases, a drop of almost half. A plausible interpretation is that it
had been signalled to counsel that it was not worth bringing such a claim.
In the five years after that (1997 to 2002), however, the number of claims
rose to 231, in the next five years (2002 to 2007) rose further to 424, and
in the five years after that (2007 to 2012) rose again to 475.20 A further
plausible interpretation — and one consistent with the culture of
complacency — is that as time went on the system got slower and
slower, precipitating a steady rise in the number of claims.
The pattern within decisions themselves at this time can generally be
understood as “explaining away” delay so that, like a watch you have
handed to a stage conjurer, it is suddenly not there any more. A typical
example is the Ontario Court of Appeal decision in Florence, where the
period between the accused’s arrest and the scheduled start of trial was
30 months, roughly a year outside the guidelines.21 The Court of Appeal
reassessed the trial judge’s analysis, concluding things such as that
255 days which the trial judge had called institutional delay should
actually be considered to be 214 days of institutional delay, 31 days of
neutral preparation time and 10 days of defence delay, and that a
different 329 days which the trial judge had called institutional delay was
actually only 238 days of institutional delay coupled with 91 days of
neutral inherent time requirements and preparation time, and thereby —
hey presto! — arrived at the result that the delay in the case was actually
only 14 and a half months, and therefore within the Morin and Askov
guidelines.22 They did not reassess, but did implicitly rely upon, the trial
judge’s finding that there was no prejudice because there was no
prejudice to fair trial or liberty interests.23
If you find that explanation from the appeal court less than clear, and
less than convincing, you are not alone. Cases of that sort are what
prompted the Supreme Court, with its 2009 decision in Godin, to try to
nudge the system back onto the proper course. In Godin, the trial was not
scheduled to begin until 30 months after charges were laid, well outside
20
These numbers are based on a search of “trial within a reasonable time” on Westlaw
through the relevant time periods. There might be duplications, for example, by the same case
appearing both at trial and on appeal, but that is as likely to happen throughout the period and should
not affect the general pattern.
21
R. v. Florence, [2014] O.J. No. 2702, 2014 ONCA 443 (Ont. C.A.).
22
Id., at paras. 71-72.
23
The trial judge was quoted at para. 23, id., as having held “the defence has demonstrated
no prejudice, above and beyond the inferred [prejudice] flowing from the delay.”
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the limit, but the Ontario Court of Appeal found no section 11(b)
violation. The Supreme Court of Canada overturned that result, prodding
lower courts in two ways: that “...It is important … not to lose sight of
the forest for the trees”24 and to remember that “prejudice may be
inferred from the length of the delay.”25
“Not losing sight of the forest for the trees” was an admonition not to
become preoccupied with parcelling out every single day into some
category, and thereby explain away delay — justify it — rather than
deal with it.
This point about prejudice was an attempt to restore the pre-Morin
understanding that prejudice to the security interest mattered:
...Proof of actual prejudice to the right to make full answer and defence
is not invariably required to establish a s. 11(b) violation. This is only
one of three varieties of prejudice, all of which must be considered
together with the length of the delay and the explanations for why it
occurred.26

This did lead to lower courts talking about inferred prejudice, but
frequently in the context of asking something like “was there inferred
prejudice here”. However, to think about the question in that way is to
misunderstand the point that prejudice to the security interest underlies
the right: to ask, “was there inferred prejudice” is equivalent to asking
“was this unreasonable search unreasonable”?
Did the attempt in Godin work? Unfortunately, no. Florence, the
example offered of the approach Godin tried to dislodge, post-dates
Godin by five years. It nonetheless counts every leaf on every tree, and
acknowledges the existence of “inferred prejudice” while ignoring its
importance. The gentle nudge in Godin was not, it turned out, enough to
set the juggernaut back on course.
2. The Firm Response – R. v. Jordan
The question in section 11(b) cases has always been “how long should
it take”, and as noted that question is relatively easy to answer in
individual delay cases: “did this take markedly longer than it normally
takes”? In institutional delay cases, though, Morin said the answer was
“look at the length of the delay and whether there was waiver; then take
24
25
26

Godin, supra, note 6, at para. 18.
Id., at para. 31.
Id., at para. 38.
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into account how long cases of this particular sort usually take; then look
at how the defence and the Crown acted this time; think as well about
whether it’s just hard for your particular jurisdiction to give trials in a
reasonable time; think as well about anything else that might be relevant;
then compare that number to eight to 10 months, and if you still missed
that time period, ask whether the accused has demonstrated any prejudice
as a result.” That method of answering gave judges discretion to explain
away a great deal of delay, and Morin had instructed them that explaining
away delay was the right orientation.
Faced with that self-created reality, Jordan said that the question
“how long should it take” had a simpler answer: “18 months”. As I said
earlier, this is a blunt instrument that removes discretion from judges:
however, given the 25 years of entrenched culture which had been
initiated by Morin, coupled with Godin’s demonstration that a more
nuanced approach was unlikely to change things, it was reasonable of the
majority to conclude that only a blunt instrument would succeed.
Of course their analysis is more sophisticated than simply saying
“18 months”. That is a “presumptive” ceiling that applies to trials in
inferior court, while trials in superior court face a presumptive ceiling of
30 months. That time period is measured by taking the time from the
laying of the charge to the end of trial, and then subtracting any delay
caused by the defence. Then,
If the total delay from the charge to the actual or anticipated end of trial
(minus defence delay) exceeds the ceiling, then the delay is
presumptively unreasonable. To rebut this presumption, the Crown
must establish the presence of exceptional circumstances. If it cannot,
the delay is unreasonable and a stay will follow.27

Notably and deliberately absent from this analysis is any reference to
whether the accused has or has not suffered prejudice. In addition the
seriousness of the offence is not a relevant consideration.
Broadly then, the Jordan approach requires three steps: calculate the
total time; deduct periods of defence-caused delay; and then if the time is
over the presumptive ceiling see whether there are exceptional
circumstances. There are some nuances after that — for example,
claiming a section 11(b) violation below the ceiling, or most significantly
the “transitional exception” — but these are the primary steps. We shall
first look at defence delay and exceptional circumstances based on what
27

Jordan, supra, note 1, at para. 47.
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Jordan said of them, and then turn to look at the case law which has
developed in the short time afterward.
(a) Defence Delay
The majority in Jordan envisions only two possible causes of defence
delay, and it is clear from the way they characterize them that they want
to keep the lid on this consideration, to prevent it from eating up the
right. One type of defence delay is time periods which are explicitly
or implicitly waived. Waiver is a well-established concept, and Jordan
sticks to the orthodoxy there: “...Waiver can be explicit or implicit, but in
either case, it must be clear and unequivocal.”28
The other category of defence delay is “delay caused solely by the
conduct of the defence”. This is a more amorphous standard, but the
majority clearly signals that they do not intend that matters should
routinely be explained away by this factor. They stress:
To be clear, defence actions legitimately taken to respond to the charges
fall outside the ambit of defence delay. For example, the defence must
be allowed preparation time, even where the court and the Crown are
ready to proceed. In addition, defence applications and requests that are
not frivolous will also generally not count against the defence. We have
already accounted for procedural requirements in setting the ceiling.
And such a deduction would run contrary to the accused’s right to
make full answer and defence.29

The kinds of examples they offer of defence delay are “...[d]eliberate and
calculated defence tactics aimed at causing delay, which include
frivolous applications and requests”30 or when “the court and the Crown
are ready to proceed, but the defence is not.”31 The Court’s message here
is not to be too quick to categorize something as defence delay. The
presumptive ceilings are already quite high, and were set on the
assumption that the defence is likely to do many things — seek
disclosure, make McNeil applications,32 request voir dires — and that
these are the sorts of ordinary procedures which contributed to setting

28
29
30
31
32

Id., at para. 61.
Id., at para. 65.
Id., at para. 63.
Id., at para. 64.
R. v. McNeil, [2009] S.C.J. No. 3, 2009 SCC 3 (S.C.C.).
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ceilings of 18 and 30 months, rather than the six-to-eight and eight-to-10month guidelines of Askov and Morin.33
(b) Exceptional Circumstances
If delay exceeds the presumptive ceiling, the onus is on the Crown to
justify the delay, but compared to the Morin approach Jordan
significantly restricts the ability of the Crown to do so. It is only if the
Crown can show that there were exceptional circumstances that there
will not be a violation. In the long term there are only two types of
exceptional circumstances, though in the short term the Court has
recognized a “transitional” one.
The primary sort of exceptional circumstances — discrete events —
must meet two criteria in order to justify some portion of the delay: they
must “lie outside the Crown’s control in the sense that (1) they are
reasonably unforeseen or reasonably unavoidable, and (2) Crown
counsel cannot reasonably remedy the delays emanating from those
circumstances once they arise.”34
These sorts of exceptional circumstances are meant to include things
such as, medical emergencies, but that a problem has arisen is not by
itself sufficient:
It is not enough for the Crown, once the ceiling is breached, to point to
a past difficulty. It must also show that it took reasonable available
steps to avoid and address the problem before the delay exceeded
the ceiling.35

Also important is that an exceptional circumstance of this sort does not
necessarily mean that the right was not violated: it simply means that some
discrete portion of time will be subtracted from the total. If the total still
exceeds the presumptive ceiling, then there is still a section 11(b) violation.
33

See Jordan, supra, note 1, at para. 53:

the presumptive ceiling also reflects additional time to account for the other factors that
can reasonably contribute to the time it takes to prosecute a case. These factors include
the inherent time requirements of the case and the increased complexity of criminal cases
since Morin.
That allowing the time needed for these sorts of procedures to be a justification for
exceeding the guidelines amounted to “double-counting” had been noted, pre-Jordan,
in C. Ruby, “Trial Within a Reasonable Time Under Section 11(b): The Ontario
Court of Appeal Disconnects from the Supreme Court” (2013) 2 C.R. (7th) 91.
34
35

Jordan, id., at para. 69 (emphasis in original).
Id., at para. 70 (emphasis in original).
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The second type of exceptional circumstance is the particularly
complex case. The Court left largely to the discretion of trial judges
whether a case should be classed as particularly complex, though they
did observe that a typical murder trial would not meet that definition.36
When a case is particularly complex, however, and is delayed as a result
“the delay is reasonable and no stay will issue.”37
Consistent with the desire to limit discretion and give real teeth to
section 11(b), the Court stressed that defence delay and exceptional
circumstances are the only things which can cause a case which is
initially above the presumptive ceiling not to be a violation:
The seriousness or gravity of the offence cannot be relied on.… Nor
can chronic institutional delay be relied upon.38

Those rules govern the situation where the delay in a case is above the
presumptive ceiling. The Court also allows, however, for the possibility
that a stay should be issued even if the delay is below the relevant
ceiling. In such a case the onus shifts to the accused to show a section 11(b)
violation, and to satisfy that onus “the defence must establish two things:
(1) it took meaningful steps that demonstrate a sustained effort to
expedite the proceedings; and (2) the case took markedly longer than it
reasonably should have.”39
Those are the primary features of the new system, subject to
discussion below of the transitional exception. Before considering
that, however, let us see how the Jordan approach responds to
the two problems which had led to the culture of complacency:
the role of prejudice; and the difference between individual and
institutional delay.
(c) Jordan: The Role of Prejudice
Morin had effectively undermined the section 11(b) right by its
attitude to prejudice: for practical purposes it required an accused to
show fair trial or liberty prejudice if she were to succeed; and it assumed
that generally delay was not “really” prejudicial to the accused at all.
Jordan reverses that.
36
37
38
39

Id., at para. 78.
Id., at para. 80.
Id., at para. 81.
Id., at para. 82.

(2017) 81 S.C.L.R. (2d)

MAKING TRIAL

225

Prejudice is not an explicit consideration in the Jordan analysis, but
that is only so that courts cannot rely on the absence of proven fair trial
or liberty prejudice as a way of dismissing a claim. The majority does not
treat prejudice as irrelevant: quite the opposite,
although prejudice will no longer play an explicit role in the s. 11 (b)
analysis, it informs the setting of the presumptive ceiling. Once the
ceiling is breached, we presume that accused persons will have suffered
prejudice to their Charter-protected liberty, security of the person, and
fair trial interests. …This is not, we stress, a rebuttable presumption:
once the ceiling is breached, an absence of actual prejudice cannot
convert an unreasonable delay into a reasonable one.40

In saying this, the majority has embraced the pre-Askov Lamer
position that prejudice is inherent in the right itself, and therefore that
there simply cannot be a lack of prejudice if a reasonable time has been
exceeded:
prejudice is part of the rationale for the right and is assured by the very
presence of s. 11(b) in the Charter. Consequently, there exists an
irrebuttable presumption that, as of the moment of the charge, the
accused suffers a prejudice the guarantee is aimed at limiting, and that
the prejudice increases over time.41

Indeed, Jordan presumes irrebuttable prejudice at some point to all
three of the accused’s interests, not just security. Further, to remove
ambiguity, Jordan fixes the point at which that prejudice becomes
irrebuttable: 18 or 30 months. As a result “the absence of prejudice
can in no circumstances be used to justify delays after the ceiling
is breached.”42
This approach addresses head-on — and reverses — the approach
which had been taken in Morin and which had undermined the right.
(d) Jordan: Individual vs. Institutional Delay
Jordan is particularly well-suited to dealing with the separate issues
of individual and institutional delay. As noted above, it is easy to tell
when a case took too long in an individual delay case, because it took
markedly longer than the norm: the greater challenge is telling when the
40
41
42

Id., at para. 54.
Rahey, supra, note 2, at para. 36.
Jordan, supra, note 1, at para. 81.
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norm itself is too long. Jordan’s presumptive ceilings are aimed at
exactly that point: the norm is too long if it exceeds 18 or 30 months.
But it is not just that this aspect of the test will cover the institutional
delay cases: it is that this part of the test is aimed at remedying
institutional delay. Under the Morin approach
...Delay is condemned or rationalized at the back end. As a result,
participants in the justice system — are not encouraged to take
preventative measures to address inefficient practices and resourcing
problems.43

In contrast, the Jordan approach is forward-looking, since the Crown
will see the deadline of the presumptive ceiling approaching and have a
need to act accordingly to prevent delay: “...Crown counsel will be
motivated to act proactively throughout the proceedings to preserve its
ability to justify a delay that exceeds the ceiling, should the need arise.”44
It is not enough that an unexpected problem arose: the Crown “must
also show that it took reasonable available steps to avoid and address the
problem before the delay exceeded the ceiling.”45
Consider what happened in Godin, for example, under the Morin
framework. The accused’s preliminary inquiry was scheduled for 16 months
after his arrest, a period already well past the guideline. On the date set,
other matters were also scheduled and heard first, with the result that
Godin’s preliminary inquiry did not take place that day and had to be
adjourned. It seems to have crossed no one’s mind that this was a case which
was already well past an acceptable time and that efforts should have been
made to ensure it took place as scheduled.46 Further, no one seems to have
thought that this case which was already well past the guideline and was
now being postponed again should be given special treatment in scheduling,
as opposed to simply put to the bottom of the list. To the extent that anyone
43
44
45
46

Id., at para. 41.
Id., at para. 112.
Id., at para. 70 (emphasis in original).
More accurately, it did not cross the mind of anyone in a position to do anything about it:

[13] The defence was concerned about the delay. The charges had been laid in May of
2005. With the preliminary inquiry fixed for September of 2006, the appellant was facing
a delay of 16 months for a one-day preliminary inquiry. In late February, a few days after
the September 2006 hearing had been set, defence counsel wrote to the court and the
Crown requesting an earlier date. Defence counsel proposed 31 alternative dates on
which he would be available. He received no response to this request. The Crown has
given no explanation for why this request to expedite the matter was ignored.
Godin, supra, note 6.
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thought about delay, it was a matter that could be argued later. However,
under the Jordan framework, it is now unimaginable that the need to
expedite the matter would not be front and centre in everyone’s mind.
So we no longer have an analytical framework which was designed
with individual delay in mind but is being applied to institutional delay:
the new framework consciously tackles institutional delay. No longer
will it be sufficient to move the squeaky wheels to the front of the line —
the line will need to be made to move faster. Indeed, the majority
observes that the 18 and 30 months’ ceilings have been set for now, but
are “a long time to wait for justice” and might need to be revisited.47
In addition to directly addressing institutional delay, though, the
Jordan framework also separately addresses individual delay. The rules
provide potential remedies for cases which are lower than the presumptive
ceilings. This will be based on two requirements: that the accused took
meaningful steps to expedite the case; and that the case took markedly
longer than it should. In this context, “should” will primarily be a
reflection of how long such cases usually take, and so in effect a separate
method of analysis is available for individual delay cases.
(e) Jordan: The Transitional Exception
Precisely because discretion not to find a violation had been limited so
greatly, the Court recognized the danger of another Askov-like deluge of
stays and withdrawals. To guard against that, they also created a third, short
term, exceptional circumstance: a “transitional exception” for cases already
within the system. In large part, this exception simply amounts to continuing
to apply the Morin approach to cases where there has not yet been enough
time for the practice in courts to adjust to the new Jordan reality. As the
Court, said: “for most cases that are already in the system, the release of this
decision should not automatically transform what would previously have
been considered a reasonable delay into an unreasonable one.”48
We have no clear indication as to how long this transitional period
lasts, though it will be at least until charges laid after Jordan was decided
(July 8, 2016) have come to trial, and perhaps somewhat longer than that:
in any event we are still well within it. In the short term, it means that no
case which would not have been stayed under Morin should be stayed
under Jordan.
47
48

Jordan, supra, note 1, at para. 57.
Id., at para. 102.
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III. THE IMPACT OF JORDAN
I suggested that Jordan got it right, for the reasons I have just offered:
it responds to the two problems which had existed in the case law for a
quarter century. But there is a broader sense in which Jordan got it right.
The sole remedy for a breach of section 11(b) is a stay of proceedings,
and so that is the result of a successful application. As a society, however,
we ought not to see “more stays” as a success. Rather, success should be
understood as less need for stays of proceedings to be issued, because
there are fewer violations of the right in the first place. A stay is the price
we pay for not having been sufficiently diligent in preventing delay.
Jordan balances those individual and societal interests nicely.
Because of the presumptive ceilings, the entire criminal justice system is
now worried about delay and acting to reduce it.49 But because of the
transitional exception, the number of stays being granted has not greatly
increased. That is, we are getting much more of the benefit without
paying much more of a cost.
In the six months prior to Jordan, courts dealt with 69 section 11(b)
applications: in the six months after, there were 101, nearly a 50 per cent
increase.50 That result is not surprising: Jordan was an invitation to take
section 11(b) seriously again, and so counsel who likely would not have
bothered pursuing a delay claim before were emboldened to do so. In
fact the success rate for applications also increased, from 38 per cent
beforehand to 50 per cent afterward. However, this increased success rate
is not (at least directly) a result of the new framework: there has not yet
been a single case where a judge granted a stay under Jordan that would
not have been granted under Morin. Either the analysis reached the same
conclusion under both the Jordan and Morin frameworks, or a stay that
would have been granted under the Jordan framework was refused
because of the transitional exception.51
In other words, there have been no successful delay applications that
would not have succeeded before. At least that is true in principle: it is
possible that some judges have absorbed the underlying message of
49
Various provinces have, for example, appointed new Crown prosecutors or have filled
judicial vacancies.
50
I am indebted to my research assistant, Jessica Patrick, for her sterling and assiduous
work in finding and analyzing the nearly 200 cases on Westlaw over the one-year period which has
the Jordan decision in its centre. Her own article setting out her findings in more detail can be found
in the Criminal Reports.
51
This was the case in 10 of the 50 cases where no stay was given.
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Jordan — “be worried about delay again” — and, therefore, are more
inclined to grant section 11(b) applications than they would have been
before. If so, that is in itself a good thing, and in sheer numbers its
impact — 24 more stays among the 160,000 or so cases heard across the
country in a six-month period52 — is extremely minimal. It remains
possible that once we leave the transitional period there will suddenly be
a catastrophe, but there is nothing to suggest that will be the case so far.53
It is interesting in its own right to consider the patterns in the first
six months after Jordan, though the lessons which can be learned from
them are not necessarily clear. There is of course significant variation
because of individual judges. For example, Jordan could not make clearer
that the old method of trying to parcel out each day is inappropriate:
...Trial judges should not parse each day or month, as has been the
common practice since Morin, to determine whether each step was
reasonably required. Instead, trial judges should step back from the
minutiae and adopt a bird’s-eye view of the case.54

Nonetheless some judges seem committed to applying pre-Jordan
authorities and sticking to the old methods of calculating as much as
possible,55 while in contrast others have understood Jordan to require a
departure from that approach.56 Still, broad patterns can be reported.
For example, waiver has not been a significant factor to date: in fewer
than 20 per cent of cases has any time been deducted from the total on that
basis. It might be that the pre-Jordan cases were more willing to attribute
particular time periods to waiver, and that a general greater “strictness”
about delay has changed that. It seems likely, though, that waiver will
become a more significant factor in future, because a practice of asking
defence counsel to expressly waive particular periods is likely to develop.
52

Statistics Canada, “Table 2: Cases completed in adult criminal court, by province and
territory, 2013/2014 and 2014/2015”, <http://www.statcan.gc.ca/pub/85-002-x/2017001/article/
14699/tbl/tbl02-eng.htm> shows 328,028 cases in the most recent one-year period.
53
Pre- and post-Jordan, delay cases come disproportionately from Ontario. Ontario courts
decide 38 per cent of all criminal cases (id.), but pre-Jordan 46 per cent of delay claims were in that
province and post-Jordan it is 47 per cent.
54
Jordan, supra, note 1, at para. 91.
55
See, for example, R. v. Gandhi, [2016] O.J. No. 4638, 2016 ONSC 5612 (Ont. S.C.J.).
56
See, for example, R. v. Trinh, [2016] S.J. No. 656, 2016 SKQB 376 (Sask. Q.B.):
[22] While I have set out, with the assistance of counsel, a fairly detailed and extensive
chronology, I do not propose to engage in the kind of ‘micro-counting’ disparaged in
Jordan. The lesson I draw from the majority judgment is that it is preferable for
reviewing judges simply to begin the analysis by measuring the size of the forest and then
determine whether it is necessary to count the trees.
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On the other hand, there was found to be defence-caused delay in
about 60 per cent of cases, and only in 10 per cent of those cases where it
was argued was there found to be none. That 10 per cent is a reflection of
the Jordan approach: concluding that the defence was not acting
frivolously in making requests to examine particular witnesses,57 or in
bringing particular Charter applications58 and, therefore, that the
application did not count as defence delay.
Where there was defence-caused delay, it often related to scheduling.
This was argued in about 40 per cent of the cases, and succeeded in
30 per cent; that is, the argument that the defence caused schedulingrelated delay succeeded three-quarters of the time it was made.
On the exceptional circumstance side, the Crown has had far more
success arguing for discrete events than for particular complexity. The
Crown argued for exceptional circumstances 50 per cent of the time, but
among those cases 84 per cent claimed discrete events while only 49 per
cent argued particular complexity. A discrete event claim also succeeded
more often: 64 per cent of the time as opposed to 19 per cent. Reduced to
actual totals, that means that there were only four cases where the Crown
was able to persuade the judge that the case was particularly complex
and therefore not bound by the presumptive ceiling. This suggests that
judges have adopted a level of skepticism about excusing delay which is
entirely consistent with the underlying message of Jordan.
Also seemingly consistent with that new approach is the initial
reaction to claims under the presumptive ceiling. There was a danger that
Jordan could have, in some instances, contributed to delay rather than
reducing it. That is, by setting presumptive ceilings at 18 and 30 months,
the case might have been seen as telling courts that those timelines were
sufficient: that a court which was currently more efficient than that could
relax! Happily, courts generally seem to be rejecting anything hinting of
that suggestion.59
57
See, for example, R. v. Zammit, [2016] O.J. No. 4212, 2016 ONSC 5098 (Ont. S.C.J.) or
R. v. Brissett, [2017] O.J. No. 298, 2017 ONSC 401 (Ont. S.C.J.).
58
See, for example, R. v. Penney, [2016] N.J. No. 419, 135 W.C.B. (2d) 338 (Nfld. Prov. Ct.).
59
See, for example, R. v. Trocchia, [2016] O.J. No. 4483, 2016 ONCJ 509 (Ont. C.J.); R. v.
Oyeniyi, [2016] O.J. No. 5050, 2016 ONCJ 581 (Ont. C.J.); R. v. Sedighi, [2016] O.J. No. 6736,
2016 ONCJ 741 (Ont. C.J.); R. v. Deonarine, [2016] O.J. No. 6960, 2016 ONCJ 809 (Ont. C.J.);
R. v. Edan, [2016] O.J. No. 4279, 2016 ONCJ 493 (Ont. C.J.); R. v. Hart, [2016] O.J. No. 6175,
2016 ONCJ 693 (Ont. C.J.); R. v. DeSouza, [2016] O.J. No. 5091, 2016 ONCJ 588 (Ont. C.J.); R. v.
Reynolds, [2016] O.J. No. 5300, 2016 ONCJ 606 (Ont. C.J.) or R. v. Santhanam, [2016] O.J. No. 6691,
135 W.C.B. (2d) 450 (Ont. C.J.). For the contrary view, however, see R. v. Hill, [2016] O.J. No. 5482,
2016 ONCJ 623 (Ont. C.J.).
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IV. CONCLUSION
Jordan is a controversial decision. It has focussed the attention of the
media and the public on the judicial system, and the opinions expressed
have not always been favourable. It is easy to see how those opposed can
cast the decision as a way for those guilty of crimes to get off on a
technicality, particularly as “seriousness of the offence” is no longer a factor.
But that is neither the purpose nor the effect of Jordan. No one aware
of the facts could deny that there was significant delay in the justice
system — delay which did at least as much harm to society’s interests as
it did to those of any individual accused. Further, no one aware of the
facts could deny that, institutionally, the criminal justice system was
content to let that reality linger.
Jordan has changed that. Jordan has put reducing delay in the entire
system front and centre in the minds of those who can affect the result in
individual cases, and who can affect how the system as a whole operates.
It has created that necessary level of concern without increasing in
any significant way the number of accused who actually succeed in a
section 11(b) claim. It has started us on the road to attaining the benefits
we want, and it has paid the tiniest of prices for doing so. That should be
seen as a success, and therefore — Jordan got it right.

